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Abstract—Anonymous password authentication reinforces
password authentication with the protection of user privacy.
Considering the increasing concern of individual privacy
nowadays, anonymous password authentication represents a
promising privacy-preserving authentication primitive. How-
ever, anonymous password authentication in the standard
setting has several inherent weaknesses, making its practicality
questionable. In this paper, we propose a new and efficient ap-
proach for anonymous password authentication. Our approach
assumes a different setting where users do not register their
passwords to the server; rather, they use passwords to protect
their authentication credentials. We present a concrete scheme,
and get over a number of challenges in securing password-
protected credentials against off-line guessing attacks. Our
experimental results confirm that conventional anonymous
password authentication does not scale well, while our new
scheme demonstrates very good performance.
Keywords-anonymous password authentication; guessing at-
tack; unlinkability; scalability;
I. INTRODUCTION
Inputting one’s “user ID” and “password” has been the
most common practice for authentication since the advent of
computers, and is still gaining popularity. Every day, there
are probably billions of instances of password usage in cy-
berspace. The reason for the wide employment of password
authentication is straightforward: password authentication
requires no dedicated devices, and a user only needs to
memorize his password and then can authenticate any-
where, anytime. As users are becoming increasingly roaming
nowadays, its independence of the supporting infrastructure
makes password authentication even more essential.
However, password authentication has intrinsic weak-
nesses. In particular, passwords are short (to be memoriz-
able), normally drawn from a relatively small space, thus
they have a low entropy in nature, and are susceptible to
brute-force guessing attacks. Guessing attacks can be on-
line or off-line. In the on-line guessing attack, the attacker
attempts to login to the (authentication) server in the name
of the victim user by trying a different password each time
until finding the correct one. In the off-line guessing attack,
the attacker does not need to interact with the server; instead,
it gleans the protocol transcript of a login session between a
user and the server, and then checks all possible passwords
against the login transcript to determine the actual one. On-
line guessing attacks can be easily thwarted at the system
level by limiting the number of repetitive unsuccessful login
attempts made by a user. In contrast, off-line guessing
attacks are notoriously harder to deal with, and they must
be addressed at the protocol level.
User’s activities in the digital world can be easily logged
and profiled. Abuses of individual information may cause
serious consequences to users, e.g., financial/credit losses.
For this reason, users are becoming increasingly privacy-
aware, reluctant to disclose individual information when ac-
cessing online services. However, password authentication in
general does not protect user privacy. In the standard setting
of password authentication, the server maintains a password
file with each entry being of the form 〈userID, passw〉,
where userID is the user’s identification, and passw is
either the user’s password or a password-derived value. To
login to the server, a user needs to provide his userID to the
server, who then uses the corresponding passw to engage in
the authentication protocol, where the two authenticate each
other and/or establish a shared session key between them.
To meet the growing need of privacy protection, it is desir-
able to reinforce password authentication with the protection
of user privacy. Recently, a few schemes for anonymous
password authentication [30], [32], [33] have been proposed.
In particular, anonymous password authentication promises
unlinkability, i.e., the server should not be able to link user
accesses, such that the logins from the same user cannot
be recognized as such. However, anonymous password au-
thentication in the standard setting (described above) has
inherent weaknesses. Among others, anonymous password
authentication needs to implement PIR (Private Information
Retrieval), thus the computation cost upon the server is no
better than O(N), where N is the total number of users
registered to the server. This makes the server a bottleneck
in large systems having a large number of users.
A. Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a new approach for anonymous
password authentication, solving the weaknesses in the stan-
dard setting1. In particular, our contributions are three-fold.
1To distinguish from our approach, wherever needed we will refer to
anonymous password authentication in the standard setting as conventional
anonymous password authentication.
First, we analyze the weaknesses of conventional anony-
mous password authentication. To make our analysis con-
crete, we present a generic construction for conventional
anonymous password authentication that covers all the ex-
isting schemes, and we base our analysis on this generic
construction. The first weakness is that server computation
is no better than O(N). The second is that unlinkability
can be achieved only if the server is passive. We also show
that existing anonymous password authentication schemes
may be subject to undetectable on-line guessing attacks [17],
where the server does not realize that it is experiencing on-
line guessing attacks.
Second, we propose a new approach for anonymous
password authentication, to address the weaknesses in the
standard setting. Notably, server computation in our ap-
proach is independent of the number of users in the system,
thus breaking the bound of O(N) in the standard setting.
Our approach assumes a different setting where users do
not register their passwords to the server, and the server
thus does not hold any password file. This attributes to
the success of getting over the barrier of O(N). Another
advantage resulting from the password-file-free server is
that there is no concern of immediate exposure of all user
passwords in case the server is compromised.
The main idea of our approach is as follows. The server
issues to each user a credential to be used for authentication,
and the users protect their credentials by passwords. Each
time a user logins to the server, he recovers his credential
using password, and demonstrates to the server his pos-
session of a valid credential. A notable feature is that the
password-protected credentials can be public, and no secure
device (e.g., smartcard) is needed to store the credentials.
This solves a main issue in PKI (Public Key Infrastructure),
i.e., safe management of the long secrets.
Third, we experiment on the generic anonymous password
authentication construction, and the results empirically con-
firm that conventional anonymous password authentication
has limited scalability. We also implement a prototype
of our proposed scheme, which demonstrates very good
performance.
B. Organization
In Section II, we review the related work, followed by
Section III, an overview of the main cryptographic primitives
to be used. In Section IV, we analyze the weaknesses of
conventional anonymous password authentication. Our new
approach is presented in Section V. We report the imple-
mentation results in Section VI, and Section VII concludes
the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Password Authentication
As mentioned earlier, a major challenge in password
authentication is to counter against off-line guessing attacks.
To achieve this objective, it has been proven that public key
operations, e.g., exponentiations in a multiplicative group,
are essential in designing secure password authentication
protocols [20]. But public key operations are not equivalent
to public key primitives such as public key encryption
and digital signature. Depending on whether or not public
key primitives are involved, two distinct password authen-
tication approaches exist: public-key-assisted approach, and
password-only approach.
The public-key-assisted approach enlists a combined use
of password and public key primitives, such that the users
use passwords while the server has a public/private key pair
(for encryption or signature) at its disposal. Examples of
public-key-assisted password authentication schemes include
[5], [19], [20]. The employment of a public key primitive
by the server on the one hand simplifies protocol design,
while on the other hand entails the deployment of PKI for
certification. In contrast, the password-only approach does
not involve any public key primitive, thereby eliminating the
reliance on PKI. The password-only approach, or password
authenticated key exchange (PAKE), has been extensively
studied in the literature, e.g., [3], [4], [6], [7], [24], [26].
For either public-key-assisted schemes or password-only
schemes, they assume the standard setting, where the server
holds a password file that contains all users’ password
information. A security concern is that compromise of the
server immediately reveals all passwords. A natural solution
is to deploy multiple servers to secret-share the passwords
[18], [25]. Multi-server password authentication schemes,
however, not only downgrade operational quality [29], but
also cause inconvenience for users to update passwords. The
smartcard based authentication schemes [22], [8] enforce
two-factor authentication: a user’s authentication credential
is stored in smartcard, and the smartcard is protected by
password. These two-factor authentication schemes do not
require the server to keep a password file, offering a solution
to the drawbacks of multi-server password authentication.
Our proposed approach does not require any smartcard,
while enjoying the advantage of password-file-free server.
B. Password-Enabled PKI
A prerequisite for the use of public key primitives is the
safe storage of the private keys. In principle, smartcards can
be used to store private keys. However, the use of smartcards
is not convenient, as they need the supporting infrastructure
(e.g, smartcard reader) to operate. To solve this problem,
password-enabled PKI has been proposed [29]. The idea
of password-enabled PKI is to enable the use of public
key primitives, with the private keys being protected by
passwords. There exist two general approaches to realize
password-enabled PKI. The first is to store a user’ private
key on a trusted server, and when needed the owner retrieves
the private key from the server after authenticating to the
server using password [27], [31]. The second is a key split
approach: a private key is split into two parts; the owner
holds a part generated from his password, and a trusted
server holds the other; use of the private key requires the
two to cooperate. A concern of both approaches is that the
storage server must be honest, as it learns users’ private keys.
The software smartcard technique [21] can be viewed as
a special case of password-enabled PKI, without requiring
the presence of a trusted server. The idea of software
smartcard is encrypting a private key with password, and
the encrypted private key does not need further protection.
To be secure against off-line guessing attacks, the public
key must not be publicly known. Otherwise, anyone can
recover the password and in turn the private key, based on
the relationship between the public key and the private key.
However, this contradicts the main advantage of PKI that
the public keys are public.
Our approach using password-protected credentials is
quite similar to the software smartcard technique. The reason
why off-line guessing attacks do not ruin the usage of our
password-protected credentials is that credentials are to be
used to the authentication server only, and this allows us to
conceal the structure of the credentials from anyone other
than the server. In contrast, private keys in PKI are assumed
to be used universally, without any restriction. We thus
believe that the software smartcard technique is unlikely to
succeed in the general PKI setting.
C. Anonymous Password Authentication
Anonymous password authentication is a recent primitive,
first proposed in [32]. The construction in [32] combines
a password-only protocol with a PIR (Private Information
Retrieval) protocol, where the former generates a shared key
between the user and the server, and the latter achieves user
privacy protection. Subsequently, new anonymous password
authentication schemes were proposed in [30]. These new
schemes also rely on PIR to preserve user privacy, but the
PIR protocol they use is a trivial construction, i.e., the server
passes a whole database to the user. The scheme proposed
in [33] uses the trivial PIR solution as well. [2] considered
three-party (i.e., user-gateway-server) anonymous password
authentication, and the proposed protocol also uses PIR to
attain user privacy. All these anonymous password authenti-
cation schemes assume the standard setting. As a matter of
fact, we will show shortly that the use of PIR is essential in
conventional anonymous password authentication. We find
out that these existing anonymous password authentication
schemes [2], [30], [32], [33] do not provide explicit au-
thentication of the user to the server, which may lead to
undetectable on-line guessing attacks in some applications.
D. Other Privacy-Preserving Authentication Primitives
There are a lot of privacy-preserving authentication tech-
niques proposed in the literature, among which anonymous
credential [11], [13] and group signature [1], [14] are two
important primitives, aiming to achieve unlinkability among
the whole user population. The techniques that are used
to construct anonymous credentials and group signatures
have some similarities. Compared to anonymous password
authentication, they offer a higher level of security, as
they use long secrets (i.e., credentials in anonymous cre-
dential and group signing keys in group signature). They
thus also have the problem of safe management of long
secrets. The credentials to be protected by passwords in
our approach are precisely simplified anonymous credentials
without anonymity revocation property. However, while our
approach essentially uses long secrets for authentication,
the security it offers actually depends on the strength of
passwords with respect to on-line guessing attacks, thereby
weaker than anonymous credential and group signature.
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
For ease of understanding, we review the main crypto-
graphic primitives to be used in our constructions.
Homomorphic Encryption. Homomorphic encryption
is a public-key encryption scheme, E(.), satisfying
E(m1).E(m2) = E(m1 + m2) for any m1,m2. The
Paillier encryption [28] is a typical homomorphic encryption
scheme. The Paillier homomorphic encryption works in a
multiplicative group Z∗n2 , where n is a RSA-type modulus.
To distinguish from regular public key encryption, we use
Hom_Enc(m) to denote the homeomorphic encryption of
m, and Hom_Dec(c) the decryption of a ciphertext c.
Zero-knowledge Proof of Knowledge. A Zero-knowledge
Proof of Knowledge protocol (we call it zero-knowledge
proof for short) is a two-party three-round protocol, where a
prover proves to a verifier the knowledge of a secret without
disclosing any information on the secret. The three-round
is “commit-challenge-response”. To be specific, we show a
simple zero-knowledge proof as an example, proving the
knowledge of x with respect to y such that y = gx (mod p),
where p = 2q+1 (both p, q are primes), g is a generator of
group Z∗p :
• Commit: the prover chooses a random number t ∈ Zq,
and gives a commitment r = gt (mod p) to the verifier.
• Challenge: the verifier sends back a challenge c to the
prover.
• Response: the prover computes and returns a response
s = t−cx (mod q) to the verifier. The verifier accepts
as long as gsyc = r (mod p) holds.
For simplicity, we denote the procedure by PoK{(χ) :
y = gχ}, which stands for “zero-knowledge Proof of
Knowledge of a value χ such that y = gχ”. The convention
here is that Greek letters denote the items to be proved,
while all other parameters are known to the verifier. Gener-
alizing this basic protocol, more complex relations among
elements within a group or across multiple groups can be
proved, e.g., PoK{(χ1, χ2, ..., χl) : y = gχ11 gχ22 ...gχll }, and
PoK{(χ) : y1 = gχ1 ∧ y2 = gχ2 }.
A zero-knowledge proof protocol can be made non-
interactive by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, where
the prover himself generates the challenge by applying a
collision-free hash function to the commitment. We denote
NPoK{.} the non-interactive version of PoK{.}. Further-
more, NPoK{.} is a signature on a message m if the
challenge is generated from the commitment together with
m, which is denoted NPoK{.}[m].
Pederson Commitment. A data commitment scheme allows
a prover to submit a commitment to a verifier, and prove
certain algebraic properties of the data committed by the
commitment. A commitment scheme has two properties:
hiding and binding. The hiding property refers to the ability
of a commitment concealing the committed value from the
verifier, and the binding property is the ability to prevent
the prover from changing the committed value, once the
commitment is released. The Pederson commitment [16] (on
a message m) takes the form of Cm = gm1 gr2 (mod p),
where p = 2q + 1 is defined as above, g1, g2 ∈ QRp with
QRp denoting the subgroup of quadratic residues modulo
p, and r ∈ Zq is a random number. The Pederson commit-
ment scheme is unconditionally hiding but computationally
binding.
CL Signature [12]. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [12] pro-
posed an interesting signature scheme, which allows a signer
to sign a message, while without necessarily seeing the
actual message; and allows a prover to prove the possession
of a signature on a message to the verifier who again
does not know the message. For simplicity, we call it CL
signature. Specifically, the CL signature works as follows.
Let n = pq be a RSA-type modulus, and a, b, c ∈ QRn be
random elements. The public key is then pk = (n, a, b, c)
and the private key is sk = (p, q). Both Signing and
Signature Verification can be interactive:
• Signing: to get a signature on a message m, the user
sends Cm, a Pederson commitment on m, to the signer.
The signer returns a signature (v, k, s) satisfying vk =
ambsc (mod n).
• Signature Verification: the user who has (v, k, s) proves
the possession of the signature as follows: the user first
sends to the verifier C ′m, another Pederson commitment
on m. Then the user, by a set of zero-knowledge proofs,
proves to the verifier that he knows (v, k, s), such that
vk = ambsc and C ′m is a commitment to m. To avoid
delving into the details, we use PoK{(υ, κ, ς,$) :
υκ = a$bςc)} to denote the set of zero-knowledge
proofs proving the possession of the signature.
IV. WEAKNESSES OF ANONYMOUS PASSWORD
AUTHENTICATION
Recall that in the standard setting of password authenti-
cation, the server holds all users’ password information in a
password file, and uses the corresponding user’s information
to authenticate the user. In this section, we analyze the
limitations of anonymous password authentication in the
standard setting. To make our analysis concrete, we present a
generic construction. We also show that existing anonymous
password authentication schemes [30], [32], [33], [2] may
be subject to undetectable on-line guessing attacks.
The tools we use in this generic construction are homo-
morphic encryption and PIR (Private Information Retrieval).
PIR is a cryptographic primitive allowing a user to retrieve a
string from a N -string database, without disclosing anything
on the index of the retrieved string to the server(s) holding
the database [10], [23]. A single-server PIR protocol (where
the database is held by a single server) is aimed to achieve
better communication performance than O(N), which oc-
curs in the trivial PIR solution where the server passes the
entire database to the user. For computation performance, in
the single-server PIR the server has to “touch” every string
so as to answer a request; thus the computation overhead
upon the server is at least O(N).
A. Generic Construction
Let p, q be large primes and p = 2q + 1, g ∈ QRp, and
h(.) be a cryptographic hash function. Suppose the password
information contained in the password file is a list of user
passwords, i.e., pw1, pw2, . . . , pwN , corresponding to users
U1,U2, · · · ,UN , respectively. The generic protocol between
user Ui and Server S works as follows.
Step 1. Ui generates a public/private key pair for a ho-
momorphic encryption scheme; picks a random x ∈ Zq
and computes X = gx (mod p); computes Hom_Enc(pwi).
Finally Ui sends Hom_Enc(pwi) and X to S.
Step 2. Upon reception of the login request, S first
picks a random y ∈ Zq and computes Y = gy
(mod p),AuthS = h(Y,X); for j = 1..N ,
S chooses a random rj , and computes ej =
(Hom_Enc(pwi).Hom_Enc(−pwj))rj .Hom_Enc(Y ) =
Hom_Enc((pwi − pwj)rj + Y ). Finally, S constructs a
temporary N -entry database D = {Dj}j=1..N , where
Dj = 〈ej ,AuthS〉.
Step 3. Ui engages in a PIR protocol with S to get
Di = 〈ei,AuthS〉. Then Ui computes Hom_Dec(ei) = Y ,
and tests whether h(Y,X) = AuthS. If the test passes, Ui
computes a session key sk = h(X,Y, Y x). Otherwise, Ui
aborts.
Step 4. Ui computes and sends AuthU = h(X,Y ) to S, who
then tests whether AuthU = h(X,Y ). If the test passes,
S accepts and computes sk = h(X,Y,Xy); otherwise, S
aborts.
It is not hard to understand the correctness and the
security of the protocol. Note that all the existing anonymous
password authentication schemes [2], [30], [32], [33] can be
viewed as special cases of this generic construction.
B. Undetectable On-Line Guessing Attacks
We first show that existing anonymous password au-
thentication schemes [2], [30], [32], [33] may suffer from
undetectable on-line guessing attacks [17], where the server
is not aware of the presence of on-line guessing attacks.
We notice that all the existing anonymous password
authentication schemes [2], [30], [32], [33] stop at Step 3,
without Step 4 (which enables the explicit authentication
of the user to the server). To be fair, this is not an issue
from the key establishment point of view, because of the
implicit authentication that the user is not able to compute
the shared key unless he uses a valid password. However,
without Step 4, they may succumb to undetectable on-line
guessing attacks. To see this, there are two cases to be
considered, depending on the usage of the shared session
key in the subsequent communication between the user and
the server:
• In many applications, the server simply needs to “push”
data to the user, e.g., a user downloads data from a
FTP server. In such a case, the session key is only
needed to protect the channel from the server to the
user. Undetectable on-line guessing attacks work in
these applications.
• In some other applications, the shared key will be
used by the user to interact with the server. In this
case, undetectable on-line guessing attacks are avoided,
because the server can learn in retrospection whether
the user has established the correct key.
The advantage of our generic construction is that it elim-
inates undetectable on-line guessing attacks at the authenti-
cation stage, independent of the underlying applications.
C. Weaknesses
We now analyze the limitations of the generic con-
struction. These weaknesses are inherent to conventional
anonymous password authentication, making it questionable
whether conventional anonymous password authentication is
practically useful.
Weakness 1. Server Computation O(N): It is clear that the
computation overhead upon the server is O(N), linear with
the total number of users. This in principle causes the
scalability problem in large systems having a large number
of users. In fact, in the standard (single-server) setting,
O(N) is the lower bound of server computation for anony-
mous password authentication that achieves unlinkability.
The reason is that the server’s computation has to involve
all user passwords; otherwise, those “un-touched” entries by
the server must not be the requesting user.
We can also show that anonymous password authenti-
cation has to implements PIR. In particular, PIR can be
constructed from anonymous password authentication as
follows. Associate a password with each string in the N -
string database. To retrieve a string, the requesting user uses
the corresponding password (note that the passwords are
not necessarily secret) to engage in anonymous password
authentication with the server. The server sends back to
the user every string, whose associated password has been
”touched” during anonymous password authentication. It is
clear that if the user succeeds in password authentication,
then he clearly already gets the requested string. This
corroborates the fact that server computation in anonymous
password authentication is no better than O(N), which is
the lower bound for (single-server) PIR.
Weakness 2. Passive Server: Anonymous password authenti-
cation must be secure against undetectable on-line guessing
attacks, and it should assume that the server is passive2;
otherwise, unlinkability cannot be achieved. To see this, if
the server is malicious: in Step 2 of the generic construction,
for different passwords the server picks different y’s in
computing Y,AuthS, and ej . Then in Step 4, from AuthU
the server can determine which password the user uses,
thereby breaking unlinkability. In turns out that this attack
applies to any anonymous password authentication scheme,
because for each password, the server can always use a
distinct data in negotiating the shared key with the user (of
course, there may exist countermeasures allowing the user
to detect). Passive server is a quite strong assumption, and
it may not be easy to find such a server in practice.
V. A NEW AND EFFICIENT APPROACH
We next present a new and efficient approach, solving
the above weaknesses in conventional anonymous password
authentication. Our approach assumes a different setting
where users do not register their passwords to the server,
who thus does not hold any password file. In particular,
each user is issued a credential to be used for anonymous
authentication, and the user protects his credential using
password; each time to login to the server, the user first
recovers his credential with password, and then uses the
credential for authentication with the server. Figure 1 shows
the conceptual difference between our approach and conven-
tional anonymous password authentication.
A crucial feature of the password-protected credentials is
that they can be made public, requiring no further protection.
A user can store his password-protected credential in any
portable devices, e.g., handphone, PDA, USB flash memory,
or even in a public directory. With such portability of
password-protected credentials, what a user essentially needs
at the point of login is indeed his password (this is the reason
why our approach still belongs to password authentication).
However, it is not trivial to construct password-protect
credentials preserving user privacy and secure against off-
line guessing attacks. To show the challenges, we first briefly
introduce the intuitions underlying our construction.
2A passive entity is honest, but tries to find out more useful information
from the data it is supposed to get. In contrast, a malicious entity can
behave arbitrarily in order to achieve its objective.
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Figure 1. Conceptual Comparison Between Conventional Approach and Ours
A. Overview
First Try. Since the credentials must protect user pri-
vacy, a natural choice is using blind signatures (e.g., [9])
as credentials. In particular, we adopt a “use-then-issue”
strategy, i.e., the user uses a credential (a blind signature)
for authentication, and at the end of each login, the server
issues to the user a new blind signature to be used for
next login. Since the server cannot link different blind
signatures, it is expected that this can achieve unlinkability.
Unfortunately, this is not true. To see this, not only the
server but any outsiders can recover the password from a
password-protected credential by off-line guessing attacks:
anyone can use different passwords to “undo” a password-
protected blind signature, and clearly only the right password
generates a valid blind signature.
Lesson 1: The failure of the first try is because blind signa-
tures have known structure, publicly verifiable. Likewise, us-
ing passwords to protect other privacy-preserving primitives,
e.g., anonymous credentials, has the same vulnerability. The
lesson we learned is that the credentials to be protected by
passwords should not be publicly verifiable.
Second Try. It should be clear that credentials must be
verifiable to the server, thus it is unavoidable for the server
to recover passwords. This actually is not an issue in
password authentication, since the server (in the standard
setting) holds all users’ password information. Our second
try is thus to restrict verifiability of credentials to the server
only. Continuing with the first try, one way to achieve
restricted verifiability is that the server does not publicize
the public key of the blind signature scheme, such that no
one other than the server can verify blind signatures. This
solves the issue of off-line guessing attacks by outsiders.
However, since credentials are issued real time, users also
need to check the validity of the credentials issued to them.
Therefore, this method is not acceptable.
Another way to attain restricted verifiability is to encrypt
the blind signatures with the server’s public key before
applying password protection (we assume that the server
provides public key encryption). It is easy to see that off-
line guessing attacks by outsiders are addressed. However,
this method cannot achieve unlinkability with respect to
the server. On the one hand, the user needs to surrender
the encrypted blind signatures to the server for authen-
tication purposes. On the other hand, by assumption the
server also knows the corresponding password-protected
credentials (i.e., encrypted blind signatures protected by
password). By combining the two, the server clearly can
recover the password, and thus link the encrypted blind
signatures protected by the same password.
Lesson 2: The reason for the failure is that users directly
submit the items protected by passwords (i.e., encrypted
blind signatures) to the server. The lesson is thus that the
server should be prevented from seeing the items protected
by passwords. This further means that users should not
directly submit the credentials to the server.
Third Try. Without direct submission of credentials, proving
the possession of credentials by zero-knowledge proofs
seems the only feasible choice. The CL signature [12] is
a primitive that meets this need. However, even we have
decided the strategy and the tool, there are still more to
be considered. Recall that the CL signature on message m
is (v, k, s) satisfying vk = ambsc (mod n). Without loss
of generality, let us define a user credential as (v, k, s) such
that vk = aUbsc (mod n), where U is the user’s identity. To
achieve restricted verifiability, (v, k, s) should be encrypted
by the server’s public key, as discussed above. Nevertheless,
if the entire credential is encrypted, the user himself is
unable to use the credential, because he needs to know v, k, s
in order to perform zero-knowledge proofs.
Furthermore, partial encryption of some elements of the
credential does not work either. Suppose s is encrypted3.
Then, every time to use the credential, the user needs
to pass the encrypted s to the server and then perform
PoK{(ν, κ, µ) : νκaµ = bsc} (note that the zero-knowledge
proofs are to prove vka−U = bsc (mod n)). The server
clearly can link different uses of the credential simply from
s, regardless of the zero-knowledge proofs.
A remedy is to submit a distinct encrypted item for each
3In fact, it seems to us that encrypting v or k would make it harder for
the user to perform zero-knowledge proofs.
use of the credential. Specifically, the user partitions s into
two random shares s1, s2 such that s1+ s2 = s; encrypts s1
using the server’s public key, denoted as E(s1), and protects
(v, k, s2) using password, denoted as [v, k, s2]pw. The entire
password-protected credential is thus 〈E(s1), [v, k, s2]pw〉.
Note that the encryption of s1 successfully breaks the
known structure of the credential, and no one other than
the server can verify the validity of (v, k, s2). Hence, off-
line guessing attacks by outsiders are prevented. To use
the credential for login, the user submits C = bs2gr (i.e.,
a Pederson commitment of s2) together with E(s1) to
the server. The server decrypts to get s1 and computes
Cbs1c = bs1+s2grc = bsgrc, and then the user executes
PoK{(ν, κ, µ, γ) : νκaµgγ = Cbs1c}, where the zero-
knowledge proofs are to prove vka−Ugr = bsgrc (mod n).
At the end of the login, the server sends back s1 to the
user, who then restores s and re-partitions it into two new
shares. In this way, the user is entitled to submit a distinct
s1 each time to the server. Does this solve the problem?
Unfortunately, the server can still link uses of the credential.
The situation is similar to that in the second try: the server
can recover the password used to protect (v, k, s2), and
associate it with s1; therefore, the server can link different s1
associated with the same password, regardless of the zero-
knowledge proofs.
Lesson 3: The lesson we learned is that the user should
never directly submit the data in storage (i.e., E(s1)) to the
server, whether it is an entire credential or a part thereof.
Final Try. It is now clear that the encrypted item submitted
to the server has to be different from that in storage. To
achieve this, the user needs to manipulate E(s1) before
submission, and render the resulting item in encryption
distinct from s1. The actual method we use is that the
user further partitions s2 into two random shares s〈1〉2 , s
〈2〉
2
such that s2 = s〈1〉2 + s
〈2〉
2 , and adds s
〈1〉
2 to s1 to generate
E(s′1) = E(s1+ s
〈1〉
2 ). Here s
〈1〉
2 serves as a blinding factor
to blind s1. Then the user submits E(s′1) and C = bs
〈2〉
2 gr
to the server; the construction of zero-knowledge proofs
remain unchanged. Since the manipulation is performed
upon ciphertexts, the public key encryption possessed by
the server should be homomorphic.
B. Details of the Scheme
Setup: The server S sets up pkCL = (n =
p′q′, a, b, c), skCL = (p′, q′) for the CL signature; and
picks g, h ∈ QRn. S also has a public/private key
pair (pkS , skS) for homomorphic encryption, and we use
Hom_EncS(.),Hom_DecS(.) to denote the encryption func-
tion under pkS , and the decryption function under skS ,
respectively. S decides a cryptographic hash function H(.),
and a symmetric key encryption enc(.). The public system
parameters include (pkCL, g, h, pkS ,H(.), enc(.)).
Registration: Users need to register to the server in
advance, getting a credential to be used for authentication.
The server issues each user Ui a credential (vi, ki, si)
using the CL signature scheme, satisfying vkii = aUibsic
(mod n), where Ui is the user’s identity. Upon reception
of his credential, Ui partitions si into two random shares
si,1, si,2 such that si = si,1 + si,2; encrypts si,1 using the
server’s public key, i.e., Ei,1 = Hom_EncS(si,1); protects
(vi, si,2) using his password pwi, i.e, Ei,2 = [vi, si,2]pwi ,
where [.]pw denotes, e.g., symmetric key encryption with a
key derived from pw. Finally, Ui puts 〈Ei,1, Ei,2, ki〉 to his
preferred storage, e.g., handphone, USB flash memory, or a
public directory.
Authentication: Suppose a user U already has his
password-protected credential 〈E1 = Hom_EncS(s1), E2 =
[v, s2]pw, k〉 available at the point of login. The authentica-
tion protocol between U and server S is as follows.
Step 1. U does the following computations.
(1). Recovers (v, s2) by decrypting E2 with his password
pw.
(2) Partitions s2 into two shares s〈1〉2 , s〈2〉2 , such that
s2 = s
〈1〉
2 + s
〈2〉
2 . Computes E′1 = E1.Hom_EncS(s
〈1〉
2 ) =
Hom_EncS(s1 + s
〈1〉
2 ).
(3). Picks a random r ∈ [0..n/4], computes R = bs〈2〉2 hr
(mod n) and Σ(R) = NPoK{(ς, γ) : R = bςhγ}. Note
that the zero-knowledge proof guarantees that R is well-
formed.
(4). Computes V = vka−Uhr (mod n); picks a random
x ∈ [0..n/4] and computes X = gx (mod n), X∗ =
Hom_EncS(X); constructs Σ(V ) = NPoK{(ν, κ, µ, γ) :
V = νκaµhγ}[X∗, R].
(5). Finally, U sends E′1, R,Σ(R), X∗,Σ(V ) to S as a
login request:
U −→ S: E′1, R,Σ(R), X∗,Σ(V )
Step 2. Upon reception of the login request, S does the
following.
(1). Verifies the validity of Σ(R), and aborts if not valid.
(2). Computes Hom_DecS(E′1) = s′1 = s1 + s〈1〉2 , and
computes V ′ = Rbs′1c = bs′1+s
〈2〉
2 hrc = bshrc (mod n). V ′
should be equal to V .
(3). With V ′, verifies the validity of Σ(V ), and aborts if
not valid.
(4). Computes Hom_DecS(X∗) = X . Chooses a random
y ∈ [0..n/4], computes Y = gy (mod n), and a temporary
key tk = H(Xy). Encrypts s′1 by symmetric key encryption
as enctk(s′1).
(5). Finally, computes the shared key sk = H(X,Y,Xy),
and returns Y, enctk(s′1) to U :
S −→ U : Y, enctk(s′1)
Step 3. U concludes the login process as follows.
(1). Computes tk = H(Y x), and decrypts enctk(s′1) to
get s′1. Restores s = s′1 + s
〈2〉
2 , and checks whether vk =
aUbsc (mod n). Aborts if not valid.
(2). Computes a shared key sk = H(X,Y, Y x), and
ends the authentication procedure. The password protected
credential remains the same for the next login.
Note that the server sending back s′1 to the user is to
authenticate the server to the user, in that only the server
can correctly decrypt E′1, X∗ to get s′1, X , and in turn
make the user accept. In fact, the correct computation of
tk suffices authenticating the server, and sending back s′1 is
not absolutely necessary. Step 3 thus can be simplified such
that the server authenticates to the user by tk, e.g., using
MAC keyed by tk.
C. Security Analysis
Due to the limited space, the following definitions and
analysis are informal.
1) Adversary Model: Either the server or outsiders could
be the adversary in our system, with respect to different
security objectives listed below. An outsider is defined to be
anyone other than the server and the user who are engaging
in the authentication protocol. The adversary is malicious,
can do arbitrarily in order to violate the respective secu-
rity objectives. In particular, we assume that the adversary
acquires all users’ password-protected credentials.
2) Security Objectives: We desire the following security
objectives.
−Authentication [Outsiders]. The authentication objective
requires that an outsider cannot impersonate a valid user to
the server, and vice versa.
−Secrecy of Session Key [Outsiders]. It requires that an
outsider should not learn the session key established between
the server and the user.
−Off-line Guessing Attacks [Outsiders]. The resistance
against off-line guessing attacks is with respect to the
outsiders. It requires that an outsider should not be able
to recover passwords used to protect credentials by off-line
guessing attacks.
−Unlinkability [Server]. The user unlinkability is defined
with respect to the server. It requires that the server cannot
link different logins by the same user.
3) Security Analysis: We show the intuitions on how our
scheme manages to satisfy the above security objectives.
Authentication. In our scheme, authentication of the user
to the server is by Σ(V ). Without the knowledge of a valid
CL signature (v, k, s), an outsider is not able to generate E′1,
which makes the server accept Σ(V ). This is the unforge-
ability of the CL signature [12]. We notice that the user’s
message contains no freshness data from the server, so replay
is possible. But this is not a big issue, since using timestamp
or an extra round of interaction suffices to solve the problem.
Note also that Σ(V ) essentially asserts vk = aUc, but again
this is not an issue, since no one can compute such (v, k)
without the help of the server; better yet, it is easy to
attain the same strength as the original CL signature if the
server uses a variant satisfying vk = ambs1bsˆ2c (mod n),
with (v, k, s, sˆ) being the credential.
Authentication of the server to the user is by E′1, X∗. An
outsider clearly cannot decrypt E′1, X∗ to get correct s′1 and
X , and in turn enctk(s′1) that will be accepted by the user.
Secrecy of Session Key. Establishment of the shared ses-
sion key sk is through the exchange of X and Y by DH key
exchange protocol. Given the authentication property, the
exchange of X,Y is authenticated, so an outsider cannot
play main-in-the-middle. As such, an outsider observing
communication between user and server can learn Y only.
Thus the outsider is unable to compute gxy . Note that even
the outsider also learns X , he still cannot compute gxy from
X,Y , according to the (computational) DH assumption.
Off-line Guessing Attacks. Our scheme is a two-round
protocol: user-requests-then-server-responds. Active adver-
sarial behaviors such as impersonation do not gain an
outsider more advantages in terms of off-line guessing
attacks than passive interception of communication, because
the server will not respond unless he is assured of the
genuineness of the user. With this in mind, the data that may
be helpful to a passive outsider in off-line guessing attacks
include 〈E1, E2〉, E′1,Σ(V ), and [s′1]tk. As we discussed in
Section V-A, from E1, E2, an outsider cannot succeed in off-
line guessing attacks, because the known structure of the CL
signature has been broken. E′1 and Σ(V ) do not help off-line
guessing attacks either, as the zero-knowledge proofs do not
reveal information on the items to be proved. [s′1]tk clearly
is of no use to the outsider for off-line guessing attacks,
considering the secrecy of tk.
Unlinkability. As we have discussed, the user surrenders
to the server a distinct s′1 each time, and s′1 is different from
s1, thus the server cannot link users from s′1 and s1. From
bs
′
1R = bshr, the server cannot link either, because r differs
each time. It remains to examine whether Σ(V ) helps the
server link users. It is important to know that by off-line
guessing attacks, the server can learn all users’ passwords,
and in turn all credentials. For the analysis, let us consider a
scenario, which is the most favorable to the server trying to
break unlinkability: the server happens to use U’s credential
(v, k, s) to determine whether his counterpart indeed uses
this credential. In the CL signature scheme, Σ(V ) consists
of a set of zero-knowledge proofs, each of which is of
the following form: to prove the knowledge of x, the user
computes Cx = gx1gr2 , a Pederson commitment on x, and
then constructs Σ(Cx) = NPoK{(χ, γ) : gχ1 gγ2 = Cx}.
Without loss of generality, it suffices to see whether the
server (knowing x) can relate Cx,Σ(Cx) to x.
We need to delve into the content of Σ(Cx) = (C, S1, S2),
which are computed as follows: R = gx′1 gr
′
2 , where x′, r′ are
random numbers; then C = h(R), S1 = x′− xC, S2 = r′−
rC. Here h(.) is a collision-free hash function. Verification
of Σ(Cx) is to test whether C = h(gS11 g
S2
2 C
C
x ). We claim
that the server cannot associate Cx,Σ(Cx) with x in the
information-theoretic sense. To see this, for any x¯, there is
a corresponding r¯, satisfying Cx = gx¯1gr¯2 . It can be easily
verified that (C,S1, S2) is a valid zero-knowledge proof for
any of such pair x¯, r¯.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of our proposed approach, we
implemented a simple prototype, written in C/C++ and the
Crypto++ libraries [15]. We also implemented the generic
anonymous password authentication construction for exper-
iments, and the experimental results empirically confirm that
conventional anonymous password authentication is indeed
not scalable. For both implementations, the client program
runs on a Fujitsu notebook, Intel Core2 Duo CPU, 2.53GHz,
OS Windows Vista, and the server program runs on a PC,
Intel Pentium D CUP, 3.00GHz, OS Windows XP. We next
report the implementation results.
A. Limited Scalability of Generic Construction
We have analyzed that the computational overhead upon
the server in conventional anonymous password authentica-
tion is linear with the total number of users. This will cause
scalability problem in large systems. To empirically deter-
mine how serious the problem is, we implement the generic
construction proposed in Section IV. While specific schemes
could be more efficient than the generic construction, the
difference should not be drastic in principle.
In this implementation, we adopt the trivial PIR solution
in Step 3, such that the server simply sends to the user all
ej’s, together with AuthS; other steps remain unchanged.
We use 2048-bit Paillier homomorphic encryption (i.e.,
|n2| = 2048 bits), and h(.) is instantiated by SHA-1.
Figure 2 shows the experimental results with respect to
differen number of passwords contained in the server’s
password file.
Figure 2. Experimental Results on Generic Construction
Suppose that users can tolerate up to 30 seconds of
login latency, the generic construction can only support
approximately 2000 users, according to Figure 2. The
experimental results confirm that conventional anonymous
password authentication is not acceptable to large systems
having tens/hundreds of thousands of users.
B. Implementation Results of Our New Scheme
Below lists the instantiation of the cryptographic primi-
tives and the parameters involved in the implementation of
our new scheme:
CL signature |n| = 1024
Pederson commitment |p| = 1024
Homomorphic encryption 2048-bit Pederson encryption
Hash function H(.) SHA-1
Symmetric key encryption
enc(.)
128-bit AES
Authenticated symmetric key
encryption [.]
128-bit AES + keyed SHA-1
Figure 3 shows the client program. To initiate a login, the
user needs to input his password, and indicate the password-
protected credential to be read. Our current implementa-
tion supports downloading the password-protected credential
from a FTP server, or reading it from a USB external device
(e.g., USB flash memory). Then the user clicks “OK” button,
and the client program starts the proposed authentication
protocol with the server. Our testing results show that it takes
about 0.8 second for the user and the server to complete the
authentication protocol. We obtained this average time from
200 runs of the protocol.
Figure 3. Client Program
VII. CONCLUSION
Anonymous password authentication enjoys the advan-
tages of password authentication while providing user pri-
vacy protection. However, anonymous password authentica-
tion in the standard setting has intrinsic weaknesses. To solve
these problems, we proposed a new approach for anonymous
password authentication, assuming a different setting where
users use password-protected credentials. We implemented a
prototype of the proposed scheme, which demonstrated very
good performance for real applications. There are issues un-
adressed in our scheme, e.g., user revocation. These will be
our future work.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work is supported by the A*STAR project SEDS-
0721330047.
REFERENCES
[1] G. Ateniese, J. Camenisch, M. Joye, and G. Tsudik, A Practi-
cal and Provably Secure Coalition-Resistant Group Signature
Scheme. Proc. Advances in Cryptology, Crypto’00, LNCS
1880, pp. 255-270, 2000.
[2] M. Abdalla, M. Izabachene, and D. Pointcheval, Anonymous
and Transparent Gateway-Based Password-Authenticated Key
Exchange. Proc. International Conference on Cryptology and
Network Security, CANS’08, pp. 133-148, 2008.
[3] E. Bresson, O. Chevassut, and D. Pointcheval, Security Proofs
for an Efficient Password-Based Key Exchange. Proc. ACM.
Computer and Communication Security, pp. 241-250, 2003.
[4] S. Bellovin and M. Merritt, Encrypted Key Exchange:
Password-Based Protocols Secure Against Dictionary Attacks.
Proc. IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy,
pp. 72-84, 1992.
[5] M. K. Boyarsky, Public-key Cryptography and Password Pro-
tocols: The Multi-User Case. Proc. ACM. Computer and
Communication Security, pp. 63-72, 1999.
[6] V. Boyko, P. Mackenzie, and S. Patel, Provably secure
password-authenticated key exchange using Diffie-Hellman.
Proc. Advances in Cryptology, Eurocrypt’00, LNCS 1807,
2000.
[7] M. Bellare, D. Pointcheval, and P. Rogaway, Authenticated Key
Exchange Secure Against Dictionary Attacks. Proc. Advances
in Cryptology, Eurocrypt’00, pp. 139-155, 2000.
[8] H. Y. Chien, J. Jan, and Y. Tseng, An Efficient and Practi-
cal Solution to Remote Authentication. Computer & Security,
21(4), pp. 372-375, 2002.
[9] D. Chaum, Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments. Proc.
Avances in Cryptology, Crypto’82, pp. 199-203, 1982.
[10] B. Chor, E. Kushilevitz, O. Goldreich, and M. Sudan, Private
information retrieval. Journal of the ACM, 1995.
[11] J. Camenisch, and A. Lysyanskaya, Efficient Non-transferable
Anonymous Multi-Show Credential System with Optional
Anonymity Revocation. Proc. Advances in Cryptology, Euro-
crypt’01, LNCS 2045, pp. 93-118, 2001.
[12] J. Camenisch, and A. Lysyanskaya, A Signature Scheme
with Efficient Protocols. Proc. Security and Cryptography for
Networks, SCN’02, LNCS 2576, pp. 268-289, 2002.
[13] J. Camenisch, and A. Lysyanskaya, Signature Schemes and
Anonymous Credentials from Bilinear Maps. Proc. Advances
in Cryptology, Crypto’04, LNCS 3152, pp. 56-72, 2004
[14] J. Camenisch, and M. Stadler. Efficient Group Signature
Schemes for Large Groups. Proc. Advances in Cryptology,
Crypto’97, LNCS 1296, pp. 410-424, 1997.
[15] http://www.cryptopp.com/
[16] I. Damagard and E. Fujisaki, An Integer Commitment Scheme
Based on Groups with Hidden Order. IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive 2001/064, 2001.
[17] Y. Ding and P. Horster, Undetectable On-line Password
Guessing Attacks. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review,
Vol. 29(4), pp. 77-86, 1995.
[18] W. Ford and B. S. Kaliski Jr, Sever-assisted Generation of
a Strong Secret From a Password. IEEE. 9th International
Workshop on Enabling Technologies, 2000.
[19] L. Gong, M. Lomas, R. Needham, and J. Saltzer, Protecting
Poorly Chosen Secrets from Guessing Attacks. IEEE Journal
on Seclected Areas in Communications, 11(5), pp. 648-656,
1993.
[20] S. Halevi and H. Krawczyk, Public-key Cryptography and
Password Protocols. Proc. ACM. Computer and Communica-
tion Security, pp. 122-131, 1998.
[21] D. Hoover and B. Kausik, Software Smart Cards via Crypto-
graphic Camouflage. Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, 1999.
[22] M. S. Hwang and L. H. Li, A New Remote User Authen-
tication Scheme using Smart Cards. IEEE Transactions on
Consumer Electronics 46(1), pp. 28-30, 2000.
[23] E. Kushilevitz and R. Ostrovsky, Replication is not needed:
single database, computationally private information retrieval.
Proc. 38th IEEE Symp. on Foundation of Computer Science,
pp.364-373, 1997.
[24] J. Katz, R. Ostrovsky, and M. Yung, Efficient Password-
Authenticated Key Exchange Using Human-Memorable Pass-
words. Proc. Advances in Cryptology, Eurocrypt’01, LNCS
2045, pp. 475-494, 2001.
[25] P. Mackenzie, T. Shrimpton, and M. Jakobsson, Threshold
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange. Proc. Advances in
Cryptology, Crypto’02, LNCS 2442, pp. 385-400, 2002.
[26] M. H. Nguyen and S. P. Vadhan, Simpler Session-Key Gen-
eration from Short Random Passwords. Proc. Theory of Cryp-
tography, TCC’04, pp. 428-445, 2004.
[27] R. Perlman and C. Kaufman, Secure Password-based Pro-
tocols for Downloading A Private Key. Proc. Network and
Distributed Systems Security Symposium, NDSS’99, 1999.
[28] P. Paillier, Public-key Cryptosystems based on Composite
Degree Residuosity Classes. Proc. Advances in Cryptology,
Eurocrypt’99, pp. 223-238, 1999.
[29] R. Sandhu, M. Bellar, and R. Ganesan, Password Enabled
PKI: Virtual Smartcards vs. Virtual Soft Tokens. Proc. 1st
Annual PKI Research Workshop, pp. 89-96, 2002.
[30] S. Shin, K. Kobara, and H. Imai, A Secure Construction for
Threshold Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange.
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals, Vol. E91-A, No. 11, pp.
3312-3323, 2008.
[31] J. Tardo and K. Alagappan, SPX: Global Authenticaiton Using
Public Key Certificate, Proc. IEEE Sysmposium on Security
and Privacy, pp. 232-244, 1991.
[32] D. Q. Viet, A. Yamamura, and T. Hidema, Anonymous
Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange. Proc. Advances
in Cryptology, Indocrypt’05, LNCS 3797, pp. 233-257, 2005.
[33] J. Yang and Z. Zhang, A New Anonymous Password-Based
Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol. Proc. Advances in Cryp-
tology, Indocrypt’08, pp. 200-212, 2008.
View publication stats
